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STATELESSNESS AND THE CITIZENSHIP
AMENDMENT ACT, 2019: THE CASE
OF SRI LANKAN TAMIL REFUGEES
—Urvi Pathak*

For decades since the Sri Lankan civil war, Sri Lankan Tamil
refugees have lived as stateless persons in India. However,
India does not recognise “refugees” and “stateless persons”
as legally separate categories, and treats them in a common
immigration system with “ foreigners”. This conflation of citizenship law with the immigration regime is a result of the
introduction of the category of “illegal migrant” as a determinative tool of Indian citizenship.
This paper explores recent shifts in Indian citizenship
laws, which have been embroiled in the tension between
jus soli and jus sanguinis bases of citizenship, particularly
with the category of “illegal migrant” and the Citizenship
(Amendment) Act, 2019, and their impact on Sri Lankan
Tamil refugees’ citizenship. This paper finds that despite the
influence of international human rights, formal citizenship
continues to be the clinching factor in Sri Lankan Tamil refugees’ quality and security of life in India today – an echo of
Hannah Arendt’s conception of the “right to have rights”, by
which she meant that the right to citizenship is a gateway for
an individual to access all other rights.
Against this backdrop, this paper suggests interim solutions
for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees to secure formal citizenship
in India, and in particular, the role of courts in crafting
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jurisprudence that would support the alleviation of their
statelessness. In the same breath, this paper strongly argues
in favour of, first, the need for a forward-looking reconceptualization of Indian citizenship laws based on the jus soli
principle; and second, a recognition of India’s burden under
the UN Conventions on statelessness to reduce and prevent
statelessness, particularly through eliminating documentation-heavy citizenship determinations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (“2019 Act”), and
the proposed National Register of Citizens (“NRC”) exercise have made citizenship the most contested topic in India, given that these two changes seek
to radically alter the foundations of Indian citizenship law and potentially render millions of people stateless.1Under the Convention Relating to the Status of
1

Gautam Bhatia et al., On citizenship (Aleph Book Company 2021); Human Rights Watch,
“Shoot the traitors”: Discrimination against Muslims under India’s new citizenship policy (2020); Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘Citizenship Law in India, a Populist Polarization?’ (6
February 2020) <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/02/06/citizenship-law-in-india-populist-polarization-pub-81023> accessed 28 July 2021; Centre for Policy Research, ‘Unpacking
the Citizenship Amendment Act’ (18 December 2019) <https://www.cprindia.org/news/
unpacking-citizenship-amendment-act> accessed 28 July 2021; Jhuma Sen, ‘Afterlives
of Partition: citizenship and legal belongings’ (JGU Publications, 8 May 2020) <http://
dspace.jgu.edu.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/10739/3600/1/Afterlives%20of %20Partition.pdf >
accessed 28 July 2021; Niraja Gopal Jayal, ‘View: India on a slippery slope towards an
ethno-national state’ (Economic Times, 14 December 2019) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/view-india-on-a-slippery-slope-towards-an-ethno-national-state/articleshow/72624503.cms?from=mdr> accessed 28 July 2021; Peter McCullin
Centre on Statelessness, ‘Citizenship, constitutionalism and civil liberties: A briefing note
on recent developments in India’ (17 July 2020) <https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/
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Stateless Persons, 1954 (“1954 Convention”), a stateless person is one “who is
not considered as a national by any state under operation of its law.”2
The 2019 Act relaxes the requirements for obtaining Indian citizenship for
refugees fleeing religious persecution.3 However, the scope of the 2019 Act is
narrow and specific, leaving out several notable groups of South Asian refugees. As a result, these excluded groups will be forced to live as stateless individuals in India.4
One category of refugees that the 2019 Act fails to provide for are the Sri
Lankan Tamils, who had fled to India in the wake of the Sri Lankan civil war
and have lived in Indian refugee camps ever since.5 Presently, they cannot
gain citizenship in either Indian or Sri Lanka.6 Although the Tamil Nadu and
Central governments have devised numerous welfare measures for these refugees7, there has been little constructive action towards granting them Indian

2

3
4

5

6

7

pdf_file/0003/3441054/Statelessness-in-India-Briefing-Note.pdf> accessed 28 July 2021;
Anupama Roy, ‘In the name of a majority’ (The Hindu, 13 December 2019) <https://www.
thehindu.com/opinion/lead/in-the-name-of-a-majority/article30289562.ece> accessed 28 July
2021; Anas Tanwir and Sanobar Fatma, ‘New Citizenship Act is illogical and poorly drafted’
(National Herald, 14 December 2019) <https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/new-actis-illogical-and-poorly-drafted> accessed 28 July 2021.
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954 (adopted 28 September 1954,
entered into force 6 June 1960), art 1 (“1954 Convention”); Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness 1961 (adopted 30 August 1961, entered into force 13 December 1975) (“1961
Convention”); in popular culture, the film ‘The Terminal’ depicts statelessness based on a
real-life story of an Iranian-born refugee rendered stateless forced to live in the Charles de
Gaulle International Airport in Paris for sixteen years as in Paul Berczeller ‘The man who
lost his past’ (The Guardian, 6 September 2004) <https://www.theguardian.com/film/2004/
sep/06/features.features11> accessed 28 July 2021.
2019 Act, s 2, s 6.
“Refugee” and “stateless person” are conceptually and legally different categories; however,
under Indian law, these two groups experience no differentiation. Further, most Sri Lankan
Tamil refugees in India are also stateless.
BS Chimni, ‘The Legal Condition of Refugees in India’ (1994) 7 Journal of Refugee Studies
378; Nasreen Chowdhory, ‘The Idea of “Belonging” and Citizenship Among Refugees: Some
Theoretical Considerations’ in Nasreen Chowdhory (ed), Refugees, Citizenship and Belonging
in South Asia: Contested Terrains (Springer 2018); Rina Chandran, ‘Missing from India’s
Citizenship Law: 100,000 Sri Lankan Refugees’ (Reuters, 3 December 2019) <https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-india-refugees-protests-trfn-idUSKBN1YS0VA> accessed 28 July 2021.
Sen (n 1); Rebecca Wolozin, ‘Citizenship Issues and Issuing Citizenship: A Case Study of
Sri Lanka’s Citizenship Laws in a Global Context’ (2009) 16 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy
Journal 1; Rajesh Venugopal, Nationalism, Development and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka
(Cambridge University Press 2018); Nithyani Anandakugan, ‘The Sri Lankan Civil War and
its History, Revisited in 2020’ (Harvard International Review, 31 August 2020) <https://hir.
harvard.edu/sri-lankan-civil-war/#:~:text=The%20war%20was%20mainly%20a,state%20
for%20the%20Tamil%20minority> accessed 28 July 2021.
Manohar Velamati, ‘Sri Lankan Tamil Migration and Settlement: Time for Reconsideration’
(2009) 65 India Quarterly 271; BS Chimni, ‘Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in
Voluntary Repatriation’ [1993] 5 International Journal of Refugee Law 442.
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citizenship.8 The Tamil Nadu government have been trying to find a middle
ground in terms of citizenship for these refugees,9 including the potential introduction of dual citizenship proposals.10 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees’ unsuccessful attempts at acquiring Indian citizenship have made them fearful of the
repercussions of the 2019 Act, especially the possibility of deportation.11
The adverse impact of the 2019 Act proves to be even more lethal if one
considers that Indian law does not take cognisance of its responsibilities
towards stateless persons in its territory, and there seems to be no political will
to alter this predicament.12 Statelessness is an extremely vulnerable experience
that robs such individuals of the right to a social or political community, or to
access rights under domestic law as compared to citizens.13 The most recent
example of this vulnerability has been in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic,
where the government has made vaccines available free of cost only to Indian
citizens.14

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

Sitharamam Kakarala and others, India and the Challenge of Statelessness: A Review of the
Legal Framework Relating to Nationality (NLUD Press 2012); Gireesh Babu, ‘There will
be Process to Give Citizenship to Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees: FM’ (Business Standard, 19
January 2020) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/there-will-be-process-to-give-citizenship-to-sri-lankan-tamil-refugees-fm-120011900335_1.html> accessed 28
July 2021.
PTI, ‘DMK will Continue to Resist CAA, Support Citizenship for Sri Lankan Tamils: MK
Stalin’ (The Indian Express, 14 March 2021) <https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamilnadu/2021/mar/14/dmk-will-continue-to-resistcaa-support-citizenship-for-sri-lankan-tamilsmk-stalin-2276499.html> accessed 28 July 2021.
B Sivakumar, ‘Possible for Lankan Tamils to get Dual Citizenship’ (The Times of India, 19
February 2020) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/possible-for-lankan-tamils-to-get-dual-citizenship-aiadmk/articleshow/74207177.cms> accessed 28 July 2021; Web
Desk, ‘CAA: AIADMK Reiterates Request for Dual Citizenship for Lankan Tamil Refugees’
(The Week, 6 January 2020) <https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2020/01/06/caa-aiadmk-reiterates-request-for-dual-citizenship-to-lankan-tamil-refugees.html> accessed 28 July 2021;
however, some commentators are sceptical of this suggestion as in V Suryanarayan, ‘Dual
Citizenship for Refugees is Impractical’ (The Indian Express, 12 March 2021) <https://
www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2021/mar/12/dual-citizenship-for-refugeesis-impractical-2275468.html> accessed 28 July 2021.
KA Shaji, ‘CAA: Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees Say the New Law has Killed their Hopes of
Citizenship’ (Huffpost, 22 December 2019) <https://www.huffpost.com/archive/in/entry/citizenship-amendment-act-sri-lankan-tamil-refugees_in_5dff246ce4b05b08bab6aff2> accessed
28 July 2021.
Shuvro Sarker, Refugee Law in India: The Road from Ambiguity to Protection (Palgrave
Macmillan 2017); Angshuman Choudhury, Why is the Indian State Shockingly Blind to the
Problem of Statelessness? (Scroll.in, 30 October 2019) <https://scroll.in/article/940712/why-isthe-indian-state-shockingly-blind-to-the-problem-of-statelessness> accessed 28 July 2021.
Charlotte-Anne Malischewski, ‘Legal Brief on Statelessness: Law in the Indian Context’ in
Calcutta Research Group, Statelessness in Law: Two Assessments, Policies and Practices, No.
60 [2014].
UNHCR, The Impact of COVID-19 on Stateless Populations: Policy Recommendations and
Good Practices on Vaccine Access and Civil Registration (2021).
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The
2019
Act
has
been
met
with
monumental
backlash
in
the
form
of
nationwide
protests
countered by police crackdowns,15 and 130 petitions challenging its
constitutionality before the Indian Supreme Court (“SC”).16 The 2019 Act also
earned India global condemnation17 ranging from the United Nations (“UN”),18
United States (“US”),19 European Union (“EU”),20 Pakistan,21 and the
Organisation for Islamic Cooperation.22
Critics of the 2019 Act widely view it as an effort to radically redefine India
as a nation – from a pluralist and secular democracy to an ethnonationalist
state.23 They highlight that India has been forced to re-examine crucial ques15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Anjali Mody, ‘India Awakens to Fight for its Soul’ (The New York Times, 20 December 2019)
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/opinion/india-citizenship-law-protests.html> accessed
28 July 2021; Sanya Mansoor and Billy Perrigo, “‘This is not just a Muslim Fight.” Inside
the Anti-Citizenship Act Protests Rocking India’ (Time, 19 December 2019) <https://time.
com/5752186/india-protests-citizenship-act/>; accessed 28 July 2021.
Supreme Court Observer, ‘Citizenship Amendment Act, Indian Union Muslim League v
Union of India – Day 2 Arguments 22 January’ (22 January 2020) <https://www.scobserver.in/
court-case/caa/caa-day-2-arguments> accessed 28 July 2021.
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘The Rising Domestic Danger to India’s Foreign Policy Under
Modi’ (The Diplomat, 6 March 2020) <https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-rising-domestic-danger-to-indias-foreign-policy-under-modi/> accessed 28 July 2021; Citizen Bureau,
‘Protests Across the World Against CAA’ (The Citizen, 27 January 2020) <https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/6/18226/Protests-Across-the-World-Against-CAA>
accessed 28 July 2021.
Draft amicus curiae application by Michelle Bachelet Jeria, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, before the Supreme Court in Deb Mukharji v Union of
India, W.P. (C) No. 1474 of 2019. However, it is unclear if this petition was indeed put before
the SC; Arvind Narrain, ‘UN Human Rights Chief’s CAA Plea Puts the Spotlight on India’s
International Law Obligations’ (Scroll.in, 5 March 2020) <https://scroll.in/article/955177/
un-human-rights-chiefs-caa-plea-puts-the-spotlight-on-indias-international-law-obligations>
accessed 28 July 2021.
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2020 p. 20;
Mohammad Ali, ‘Another US City Passes Resolution Against India’s Citizenship Law’ (Al
Jazeera, 12 February 2020) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/12/another-us-city-passes-resolution-against-indias-citizenship-law> accessed 28 July 2021.
European Parliament, ‘European Parliament Resolution on India’s Citizenship
(Amendment) Act, 2019’ (22 January 2020) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2020-0082_EN.html> accessed 28 July 2021.
Naveed Siddiqui, ‘Pakistan Condemns “Regressive, Discriminatory” Nationality Bill
Passed by India’s Lower House’ (Dawn, 10 December 2019) <https://www.dawn.com/
news/1521480>accessed 28 July 2021.
PTI, ‘OIC Expresses Concern Over CAA, Minorities in India; Says “Closely” Following
Developments’ (The Indian Express, 23 December 2019) <https://www.newindianexpress.com/
nation/2019/dec/23/oic-expresses-concern-over-caa-minorities-in-india-says-closely-following-developments-2079712.html> accessed 28 July 2021.
Niraja Gopal Jayal, ‘Reconfiguring Citizenship in Contemporary India’ [2019] 42 Journal of
South Asian Studies 33; Prabhash Ranjan, ‘A fight for Old India’ (Telegraph, 13 January 2020)
<https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/how-the-anti-caa-protests-mark-a-pushback-fromcivic-nationalists-against-the-rising-tide-of-ethno-cultural-nationalism/cid/1735546> accessed
28 July 2021; Nazir Ahmad and Muneeb Yousuf, ‘The Idea of India—And a Transition
Toward Violent, Exclusionary Nationalism’ (The Diplomat, 2 April 2020) <https://thediplomat.
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tions which run contrary to the “conventional wisdom”24 that plurality in India
has flourished – what does it mean to be Indian? What binds India together as
a nation?25
This paper explores the conceptual framework of Indian citizenship law
and its conflation with the immigration regime in recent years. In particular,
it finds that the category of “illegal migrant” in citizenship and immigration
law has been the most contentious development, since it infuses a jus sanguinis
character in Indian citizenship, and either exacerbates statelessness or prevents
stateless persons like Sri Lankan Tamils from accessing Indian citizenship. In
this backdrop, this paper finds that formal citizenship continues to remain the
determinative tool in accessing rights for Sri Lankan Tamils in Indian refugee camps, echoing Hannah Arendt’s prophecy of citizenship being the “right
to have rights”. With the significance of formal citizenship in mind, this paper
explores pathways to Indian citizenship for Sri Lankan Tamils, and also provides a forward-looking conception of Indian citizenship.
The first section has a twofold intent: it provides a conceptual backdrop to
statelessness and links it with Hannah Arendt’s ‘right to rights’; and studies the
history behind Sri Lankan Tamils’ exodus from Sri Lanka and into India to
seek refuge.
The second section provides a framework of Indian citizenship laws, and
investigates the tension between the jus soli and jus sanguinis bases of Indian
citizenship. In particular, this tension is explored through amendments that
make Indian citizenship contingent on the fact that the applicant is not an “illegal migrant”. Next, this section tries to scrutinise if the influence of jus sanguinis in Indian citizenship law has caused the right to have rights to become
true for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees.

24

25

com/2020/04/the-idea-of-india-and-a-transition-toward-violent-exclusionary-nationalism/>
accessed 28 July 2021.
Gurharpal Singh, ‘Reassessing “Conventional Wisdom”: Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict, and India
as an Ethnic Democracy’ in Sanjib Baruah (ed), Ethnic Conflict in India (OUP 2012).
Bhatia and others (n 1); Jayal (n 23); Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (Penguin India
1997); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Burden of Democracy (Penguin Random House 2017);
Pranab Bardhan, ‘Attempts are Being made to Dismantle the Pluralistic Ideas of India that
are a Legacy of Gandhi and Tagore’ (The Indian Express, 12 October 2019) <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/un-civic-nationalism-identity-politics-society-development-hindu-rashtra-ambedkar-6064961/> accessed 28 July 2021; Swati Chawla and others,
‘Who is a Citizen in Contemporary India?’ (EpiCenter, 11 February 2020) <https://epicenter.
wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/who-citizen-contemporary-india> accessed 28 July 2021; Manash
Firaq Bhattacharjee, ‘India is Losing the Promise of Inclusivity’ (The Indian Express, 13
December 2019) <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/indian-citizenship-amendment-bill-nrc-6164215/> accessed 28 July 2021; Niraja Gopal Jayal, ‘The 2016 Citizenship
Amendment Bill Consolidates a Trend Towards a Majoritarian and Exclusionary Concept
of Indian Citizenship’ (The Caravan, 20 February 2017) <https://caravanmagazine.in/vantage/2016-citizenship-amendment-bill-majoritarian-exclusionary> accessed 28 July 2021.
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The third section provides potential pathways for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees
to obtain Indian citizenship as an interim measure, and examines the potential for the role of courts in reducing statelessness among these refugees. This
part of the paper also attempts to highlight long-term and holistic solutions
for statelessness in India through the example of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees.
Finally, this paper provides concluding remarks.
However, this paper does not intend to trace the jurisprudence of secularism
in India,26 make a finding as to the constitutionality of the 2019 Act,27 or provide an in-depth study of refugee law in India.28 Rather, it problematises recon26

27

28

See generally Abhinav Chandrachud, Republic of Religion: The Rise and Fall of Colonial
Secularism in India (Penguin Viking 2020); Jhalak Kakkar, ‘India’s New Citizenship Law
and its Anti-Secular Implications’ (Lawfare Blog, 16 January 2020) <https://www.lawfareblog.
com/indias-new-citizenship-law-and-its-anti-secular-implications> accessed 28 July 2021.
Abhinav Chandrachud, ‘Secularism and the Citizenship Amendment Act’ [2020] 4 Indian
Law Review 138; Mohsin Alam Bhat, ‘The Constitutional Case Against the Citizenship
Amendment Bill’ [2019] 7 Economic and Political Weekly 11; Mihir Desai, ‘CAA-NRCNPR and its Discontents’ [2020] 55 Economic and Political Weekly 25; Mihika Poddar, ‘The
Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016: International Law on Religion-based Discrimination and
Naturalisation Law’ [2018] 2 Indian Law Review 108; Leah Varghese and Harish Narasappa,
‘Contestations Over Indian Citizenship: An Analysis of the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill,
2016’ [2019] 31 National Law School of India Review 157; Niraja Gopal Jayal, ‘Faith-based
Citizenship The Dangerous Path India is Choosing’ (India Forum, 13 November 2019)
<https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/faith-criterion-citizenship> accessed 28 July 2021;
Madhav Khosla, ‘Religion, not Religious Persecution: Why Amended Citizenship Act is
Clearly Unconstitutional’ (The Print, 16 December 2019) <https://theprint.in/opinion/religion-not-persecution-why-amended-citizenship-act-is-unconstitutional/335867/>
accessed
28 July 2021; Pritam Baruah, ‘Not Just Equality, the CAA Betrays Constitutional Values of
Dignity, Integrity’ (The Wire, 27 December 2019) <https://thewire.in/rights/caa-constitution-equality> accessed 28 July 2021; Alok Prasanna Kumar, ‘Citizenship (Amendment) Act:
An unconstitutional Act’ (Deccan Herald, 15 December 2019) <https://www.deccanherald.
com/specials/sunday-spotlight/citizenship-amendment-act-an-unconstitutional-act-785638.
html> accessed 28 July 2021; Gautam Bhatia, ‘The Citizenship (Amendment) Act Challenge:
Three Ideas’ (Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 21 January 2020) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2020/01/21/the-citizenship-amendment-act-challenge-three-ideas/>
accessed 28 July 2021; Varun Kannan ‘The Constitutionality of the Citizenship (Amendment)
Act – A rejoinder’ (Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 3 January 2020) <https://
indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2020/01/03/guest-post-the-constitutionality-of-the-citizenship-amendment-act-a-rejoinder/> accessed 28 July 2021; Nivedhitha K, ‘The Citizenship
(Amendment) Bill is Unconstitutional’ (Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 5
December
2019)
<https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/12/05/guest-post-the-citizenship-amendment-bill-is-unconstitutional/> accessed 28 July 2021; PTI, ‘CAA Violates
Constitutional Provisions: Amartya Sen’ (The Economic Times, 8 January 2020) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/caa-violates-constitutional-provisions-amartya-sen/articleshow/73151348.cms?from=mdr> accessed 28 July 2021.
Chimni (n 5); Sarker (n 12); Patricia Hyndman, ‘The 1951 Convention Definition of Refugee:
An Appraisal with Particular Reference to the Case of Sri Lankan Tamil Applicants’
[1987] 9 Human Rights Quarterly 49; Ishita Chakrabarty ‘Show Your Religion, Claim Your
Citizenship: The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019’ [2021] 35 Emory International Law
Review Recent Developments 17; Arjun Nair, ‘National Refugee Law for India: Benefits and
Roadblocks’ (2007) Indian Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Research Papers <http://
www.ipcs.org/issue_briefs/issue_brief_pdf/51462796IPCS-ResearchPaper11-ArjunNair.pdf>
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structive ideas of Indian citizenship that seek to justify the shift of citizenship
towards jus sanguinis based in descent and religious identity by drawing on
Constituent Assembly debates on Partition and citizenship.29 It argues for an
updated re-look at the pluralist and secular foundations of Indian citizenship to
be the guiding force for moulding Indian citizenship.30

II. STATELESSNESS, THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS,
AND SRI LANKAN TAMIL REFUGEES IN INDIA
A. Conceptual framework to statelessness and Hannah Arendt’s
‘right to have rights’
A stateless person is one without citizenship from any country in the
world.31 Hannah Arendt famously drew the link between statelessness and
the inability to realise rights in the aftermath of the First World War when
Europe was teeming with millions of stateless persons.32 The First World War
saw Europe crushed under a massive wave of ethnonationalist sentiment, with
demands for independent states by various ethnic groups.33 As a result, erstwhile multinational states like Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved to give way
to separate states for, inter alia, ethnic Slovenians, Austrians, Hungarians.34

29

30

31
32

33

34

accessed 28 July 2021; Jessica Field and Srinibas Burra, ‘The Global Compact on Refugees:
Indian Perspectives and Experiences’ (2020) Academicians Working Group and UNHCR
<http://hdl.handle.net/10739/3407> accessed 28 July 2021.
As discussed by Chandrachud (n 27); Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents: An
Indian History (OUP 2013).
Bhatia (n 51); N. Ram, ‘The Evolving Politics of Citizenship in Republican India’ in Bhatia
and others (n 1).
1954 Convention, art 1.
Hannah Arendt, ‘The Decline of the Nation-state and the End of the Rights of Man’ in
Hannah Arendt (ed), The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1966) p.
296; David Fitzgerald, ‘The History of Racialized Citizenship’ in Ayelet Shachar and others
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (OUP 2017); Ute Daniel and others, ‘International
Encyclopedia of the First World War. Introduction’ (1914-1918 online, 8 October 2014)
<https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/1914-1918-online_international_encyclopedia_of_the_first_world_war_introduction> accessed 28 July 2021.
Arendt (n 32); Fitzgerald (n 32); Jennifer Llewellyn and Steve Thompson, ‘Nationalism
as a Cause of World War I’ (Alpha History, 7 September 2020) <https://alphahistory.com/
worldwar1/nationalism/> accessed 28 July 2021; Editors of Britannica Encyclopedia, ‘Paris
Peace Conference 1919-1920’ (Encyclopædia Britannica, 11 January 2021) <https://www.
britannica.com/event/Paris-Peace-Conference> accessed 28 July 2021 (“Britannica”); Office
of the Historian, ‘The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles’ (United States
Department of State) <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/paris-peace> accessed 28
July 2021.
Arendt (n 32); Jane Mader, ‘Hannah Arendt and World War I: On Statelessness and the Rise
of Totalitarian Regimes’ (Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities 1 March 2020)
<https://hac.bard.edu/amor-mundi/hannah-arendt-and-world-war-i-on-statelessness-and-therise-of-totalitarian-regimes-2020-01-03> accessed 10 February 2021
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Since there was not enough territory in Europe to accommodate all ethnicities’ demands, some groups, like Jews, were reduced to minority status.35
However, the states that housed these minorities were ethnonationalist states,
meaning that they existed by and for specific ethnic identities; as a result, the
states resented the presence of minorities in their territory.36
Although the definition of “ethnicity” is contested, it commonly refers to a
shared group identity based on characteristics like religion, race, language.37
These characteristics have also been called descriptive characteristics.38 When
states determine citizenship based on descriptive characteristics, they are following the citizenship model of jus sanguinis.39 In using jus sanguinis, the
state intends to retain its ethnonationalist character for future generations by
reproducing its existing population’s demographic.40 Thus, jus sanguinis also
derives citizenship based on descent. On the other hand, states may confer
35
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Arendt (n 32); Fitzgerald (n 32); the new states signed treaties in recognition of their obligation to safeguard minority rights. However, the obligation to preserve minority rights came in
sharp conflict with the nationalistic fervour which had birthed the ethnonationalist states, creating immense resentment of minorities as in Arendt (n 32); Kheinkor Lamarr, ‘Jurisprudence
of Minority Rights: The Changing Contours of Minority Rights’ (2018) Research
Association for Interdisciplinary Studies Working Paper 15 <http://rais.education/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/015March.pdf>; Krisztina Than and Krisztina Fenyo, ‘One Century on,
Hungarians Still Feel World War One ‘Injustice’’ (Reuters, 4 June 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ww1-century-hungary-trianon-idUSKBN23B1SD> accessed 28 July 2021;
Elizabete Aunina, ‘Perpetual Conflict of ‘Turkishness’: The Turkish State and its Minority
Groups’ (E-international Relations 11 April 2018) <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/11/04/perpetual-conflict-of-turkishness-the-turkish-state-and-its-minority-groups/> accessed 28 July 2021;
see generally, Yakub Halabi, ‘Tiny Religious Minorities and Minority Group Rights: The case
of the Druze Community’ [2020] 26 Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture 739.
Arendt (n 32); Lamarr (n 35); Edwin Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (ed), The Politics of
Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power (University of Chicago Press 1996).
Fitzgerald (n 32); although “ethnicity” is a contested term, the term “ethnic” can be understood as “those who identify themselves or are identified by others in cultural terms, such as
language, religion, tribe, nationality, and possibly race” as in Joseph Rudolph, Encyclopedia
of Modern Ethnic Conflicts (ABC-CLIO 2015); see generally, James Manor, ‘‘Ethnicity’ and
Politics in India’ [1996] 72 Royal Institute of International Affairs 459
Carolina Nuñez, ‘Mapping Citizenship: Status, Membership, and the Path in Between’ [2016]
3 Utah Law Review 477.
Fitzgerald (n 32); jus sanguinis is primarily followed in continental European countries as in
Laura van Waas, ‘Nationality Matters: Statelessness Under International Law’ Human Rights
Research Series (2008) <https://files.institutesi.org/Nationality_Matters.pdf> accessed 28
July 2021; Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the
American Polity (Yale University Press 1985); Jo Shaw, The People in Question: Citizens and
Constitutions in Uncertain Times (Bristol University Press 2020); Patrick Weil, ‘The Lessons
of the French Experience for Germany and Europe’ in David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook
(ed), Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe (Routledge 1996); Ayelet Shachar,
‘Children of a lesser state: Sustaining Global Inequality Through Citizenship Laws’ Jean
Monnet Working Paper 2/03 (2003) <https://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/03/030201.
html> accessed 28 July 2021; Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and KM Munshi, Constituent
Assembly Debates pp. 3.18.149-3.18.181 (29 April 1947) <https://www.constitutionofindia.net/
constitution_assembly_debates/volume/3/1947-04-29> accessed 28 July 2021.
Schuck and Smith (n 39).
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birth-based citizenship, termed jus soli.41 Under jus soli, citizenship is ascribed
to an individual based on an objective criterion, usually, birth in the territory
of a state.42
Rogers Brubaker has discussed the mismatch of constructing “insiders”
and “outsiders” based on ethnicity.43 On the one hand, states use formal citizenship as a bright-line rule to segregate citizens or ‘insiders’ from non-citizens or ‘outsiders’, following jus soli.44 On the other hand, states that follow
jus sanguinis base citizenship on ethnicity, and not on formal citizenship, as
the bright-line rule between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.45 In this latter scenario,
‘insiders’ are members of one specific ethnicity, whereas ‘outsiders’ are persons of other ethnicities.46
In this backdrop, Arendt argued that the post-war creation of ethnonationalist states posed an imminent threat to the rights of minorities in Europe.47
For Arendt, the absence of a political community for individuals meant that
they cannot realise their rights.48 Thus, the nation-state, specifically an ethnic
nation-state, was the only platform for individuals to realise their rights – an
idea Arendt called the ‘right to have rights’.49 For her, the right to citizenship
was the ‘right to have rights’, since it provided a gateway for individuals to
access other rights.50
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The foremost examples of countries that follow jus soli are the United Kingdom and the
US as in Waas (n 39); Erin Blakemore, ‘Why the United States Has Birthright Citizenship’
(History Stories, May 12, 2020) <https://www.history.com/news/birthright-citizenship-history-united-states> accessed 28 July 2021; Christopher Lee, ‘Jus soli and jus sanguinis in
the colonies: The Interwar Politics of Race, Culture and Multiracial Legal Status in British
Africa’ [2011] 29 Law and History Review 497.
Nuñez (n 38); Schuck and Smith (n 39).
Rogers Brubaker, ‘Citizenship as social closure’ in Rogers Brubaker (ed), Citizenship and
Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard University Press 1998).
ibid.
ibid.
ibid; Fitzgerald (n 32).
Arendt (n 32).
Arendt (n 32); for Arendt, the absence of the ethnonationalist state meant that individuals do
not have a “place in the world” to express opinions, participate in public life and exercise
rights. A “place in the world”, then, means both the territory of the political community and a
place of lawful residence as in Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights Citizenship, Humanity,
and International Law (OUP 2012); Brubaker and Laitin, and Bosniak make similar arguments as in Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, ‘Ethic and Nationalist Violence’ [1998] 24
Annual Review of Sociology 423; Linda Bosniak, ‘Citizenship Denationalized (the State of
Citizenship Symposium)’ [2000] 7 Journal of Global Legal Studies 447.
Arendt (n 32); Leila Azar, ‘Hannah Arendt: The Right to Have Rights’ (Critical Legal
Thinking, 12 July 2019) <https://criticallegalthinking.com/2019/07/12/hannah-arendt-right-tohave-rights/> accessed 28 July 2021.
Arendt (n 32); for Arendt, individuals are not born equal with inherent human rights; rather,
they realised rights through their political communities. She was not convinced in the idea of
‘universal’ human rights as in Arendt (n 32); see generally Jeffrey Isaac, ‘A New Guarantee
on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights’ [1996] 90
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India’s Constituent Assembly saw a similar sentiment being voiced by Ajit
Prasad Jain, who said that “citizenship is the bedrock of our constitution”.51 In
his view, citizenship was crucial for Indians because accessing rights, specifically constitutional rights, was contingent on citizenship.52 Thus, India has seen
its own discussions of citizenship as the right to have rights.53
Arendt prophesied that the right to have rights would come true for minorities in Europe. Although minorities were grudgingly given citizenship, the
host countries’ resentment of such minorities eventually won over. As a result,
these countries stripped minorities of citizenship and exterminated them.54 For
Arendt, the resentment, and violent extermination of minorities in Europe was
merely a logical extension of creating states based on ethnonationalism.55
Most infamously, Arendt’s nightmare played out in Nazi Germany, which
defined who a “true German” was based on ethnicity.56 Jews and other ethnicities who failed the test of being “true Germans” were denationalised, sent to
concentration camps and massacred. Thus, the construction of ethnic “outsiders” aided Nazi Germany’s Final Solution57 to exterminate ethnic outsiders.58
Race sciences, especially racial citizenships, fell into disuse in the aftermath
of the Second World War, which had witnessed the horrors Nazi Germany
had inflicted upon its perceived racial inferiors.59 To safeguard against such
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American Political Science Review 61; Morton Winston, ‘Hannah Arendt and the Challenge
of Modernity: A Phenomenology of Human Rights’ [2009] 31 Human Rights Quarterly 278.
Ajit Prasad Jain, Constituent Assembly Debates Volume XI p. 11.162.164 (22 November 1949)
<https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/11/1949-11-22>
accessed 28 July 2021; Gautam Bhatia, ‘Citizenship and the Constitution’ in Bhatia and others
(n 1).
Jain (n 51).
Bhatia (n 51).
Arendt (n 32); Kesby (n 48).
Arendt (n 32).
To identify ‘true Germans’, the Nazis employed race sciences, codifying them in the
Nuremberg Laws. The Nuremberg Laws dictated that persons of Jewish descent were not ‘true
Germans’ and ineligible for German citizenship as in Michael Berenbaum, ‘Nürnberg Laws’
(Britannica, 13 May 2020) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nurnberg-Laws> accessed 28
July 2021;
“The term “Final Solution of the Jewish Question” was a euphemism used by Nazi Germany’s
leaders. It referred to the mass murder of Europe’s Jews. It brought an end to policies aimed
at encouraging or forcing Jews to leave the German Reich and other parts of Europe” as in
US Holocaust Memorial Museum, ‘Final solution: overview’ <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/
content/en/article/final-solution-overview> accessed 28 July 2021.
Dan Stone, Histories of the Holocaust (OUP 2010); Peter Hayes and John Roth, The Oxford
Handbook of Holocaust Studies (OUP 2011); a United Nations study recognised the connection between statelessness and genocide, persecution and racism as in UN Ad Hoc Committee
on Refugees and Stateless Persons ‘A Study of Statelessness’ (1 August 1949) E/1112; E/1112/
Add.1; US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Nazi racial science <https://www.ushmm.org/collections/bibliography/nazi-racial-science> accessed 28 July 2021.
Romila Thapar, ‘Citizenship: The Right to be a Citizen’ in Bhatia and others (n 1).
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discriminatory denationalising acts by States in the future, the UN drafted
two conventions on statelessness – the 1954 Convention and the Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961 (“1961 Convention”).60 However, as many
unfortunate instances have illustrated since,61 states continue to denationalise
groups based on race or religion till date.62 Today, the1954 Convention and the
1961 Convention provide a guide for countries to mould their policies in favour
of the stateless populations they house.63

B. Historical background to Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India
Sri Lankan Tamil refugees fled religious persecution at the hands of the
Sinhalese before and during the Sri Lankan civil war, and live as stateless
individuals in Indian refugee camps. However, since they are a heterogeneous
community, they have a variety of claims to Indian citizenship.
Sri Lanka’s population has historically consisted of the Sinhalese community as the majority, and the Tamils as a minority.64 The Sinhalese community is primarily Buddhist and speak Sinhalese, whereas the Tamils are mostly
Hindu and speak Tamil.65 Within the Tamils, most are the indigenous “Jaffna
Tamils”.66 On the other hand, the smaller subset is the “Estate Tamils”, whose
forefathers were brought to Ceylon from India to work in the British
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1954 Convention; 1961 Convention; see generally Alice Edwards and Laura van Waas (ed)
Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014).
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World (Greenwood Press 2016).
The Statelessness Convention recognises that states have the right to denationalise those who
have obtained nationality through fraud or misrepresentation as in 1954 Convention, art 8.
Amrita Ghosh, ‘Evaluating the State of Statelessness – The Curious Case of no Nationality’
[2018] 2 Indian Journal of Law and International Affairs 104; Tendayi Bloom, ‘Problematizing
the Convention on Statelessness’ United Nations University Institute on Globalization, Culture
and Mobility (2013) <https://gcm.unu.edu/publications/policy-reports/problematizing-the-conventions-on-statelessness.html> accessed 28 July 2021.
Nasreen Chowdhory, ‘State Formation, Marginality and Belonging: Contextualizing Rights
of Refugees in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka’ in Nasreen Chowdhory (ed), Refugees,
Citizenship and Belonging in South Asia: Contested Terrains (Springer 2018); Nasreen
Chowdhory, ‘The Politics of Accommodation and the Rights of Tamils in Sri Lanka’ in
Nasreen Chowdhory (ed), Refugees, Citizenship and Belonging in South Asia: Contested
Terrains (Springer 2018); Partha Ghosh, Migrants, Refugees, and the Stateless in South
Asia (Sage Publications 2016); Robert Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and
Reconciliation (Brookings Institution 1999); Christine Fair, Urban Battle fields of South Asia:
Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan (Rand Corporation 2005); Nasreen
Chowdhory, ‘Citizenship and Membership: Placing Refugees in India’ in Nasir Uddin and
Nasreen Chowdhory (ed) Deterritorialised Identity and Transborder Movement in South Asia
(2019).
Wolozin (n 6).
ibid.
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plantations.67 While the two groups of Tamils share a common language and
are predominantly Hindus, they have separate identities.68
Since there is no single cause that led to the Sri Lankan civil war, it is
helpful to view the situation holistically, as an occurrence caused due to a
multitude of reasons.69 First, Sinhalese political parties dominated electoral
politics.70 Even the most prominent Tamil party, the Tamil United Liberation
Front, failed to muster votes in the 1977 and 1989 general elections.71 As a
result, Tamils could not find a voice in law-making or key governmental positions in Sri Lanka. Second, armed with dominance in the state executive and
the legislature, the Sinhalese government enacted a new constitution which
declared Sinhalese as the official language,72 and Buddhism as the state religion.73 This constitution created a furore among Tamils, who viewed it as a
direct attack on their language and religion.74 Third, the Sinhalese government
enacted a citizenship law to strip Estate Tamils of citizenship.75
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Rotberg (n 64).
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Endowment for International Peace 2020); Amita Shastri, ‘Estate Tamils, The Ceylon
Citizenship Act of 1948 and Sri Lankan Politics’ [1999] 8 Contemporary South Asia 65.
Rotberg (n 64); Fair (n 64).
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Relationships’ [1985] 69 Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 1161; Sonia Bouffard and
David Carment, ‘The Sri Lanka Peace Process: A Critical Review’ [2006] 1 Journal of South
Asian Development 151; Nuwan Senaratna, ‘A Brief History of Sri Lankan Parliamentary
Elections’ (Medium, 17 December 2019) <https://medium.com/on-politics/a-brief-history-of-sri-lankan-parliamentary-elections-ea14a98afcca> accessed 28 July 2021.
Constitution of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 1972, art 7; the language policy had far-reaching consequences; for instance, it significantly reduced Tamils’ strength in civil services and allowed
the Sinhalese to ‘take-over’ the schooling system as in Wolozin (n 6); Grace Pieris ‘The
Contribution of Education to Tamil Separatism and to the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’ [2019]
16 Aleph, UCLA Undergraduate Research Journal for the Humanities and Social Sciences 145.
Constitution of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 1972, art 6.
Wolozin (n 6); Rotberg (n 64); Fair (n 64); Shastri (n 69).
Rotberg (n 64); Chowdhory (n 64); Rashmi Dias and others, Hill Country Tamils of Sri
Lanka: Towards Meaningful Citizenship (2019); Ceylon Citizenship Act, 1948; Gerrard Khan,
‘Citizenship and Statelessness in South Asia’, Working Paper No. 47 Tufts University (2001)
<https://www.unhcr.org/research/working/3bf0ff124/citizenship-statelessness-south-asia-gerrard-khan.html> accessed 28 July 2021; citizenship was available only by establishing
descendants who were Sri Lankans, which was impossible for Estate Tamils whose forefathers were Indian citizens as in Shastri (n 69); the Supreme Court of Ceylon found that
government officials were trying to intentionally reject Estate Tamils’ applications while
implementing the Ceylon Citizenship Act, 1948 as in Wolozin (n 6); Shastri (n 69); Soosey
Fernand v Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents (1955) NLR 57
and Duraisamy v Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents (1955)
NLR 56 as in Luwie Ganeshathasan and Asanga Welikala, Report on Citizenship Law: Sri
Lanka (2017) <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46448/RSCAS_GLOBALCIT_
CR_2017_10.pdf> accessed 28 July 2021.
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Tamil militancy grew in Sri Lanka to counter Sinhalese dominance in State
and polity, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) establishing
themselves as the most critical group of the prevailing government. The LTTE
primarily demanded for the creation of a separate Tamil nation, Eelam.76 The
militancy groups embattled the Sinhala-dominated government for over three
decades, punctuated by multiple failed peace talks.77
Amidst the ethnic violence which cost civilians their lives and property,
thousands of Tamils fled the civil war and crossed the ocean into India seeking refuge.78 The fleeing groups primarily came into Tamil Nadu because they
felt a deep bond of shared culture and language. In the aftermath of the Sri
Lankan civil war, there are two main Sri Lankan Tamil clusters in India.
The first group comprises the Estate Tamils, who were repatriated to India
through pacts between India and Sri Lanka.79 The second group comprised of
refugees fleeing the civil war, who were resettled in numerous camps by the
Indian government (“Camp-Refugees”). They entered India in three waves
starting in 1984, up to 2006, based on the ebb and flow of the Sri Lankan civil
war.80
Over time, the Indian and Sri Lankan governments made several bilateral
attempts to repatriate willing Sri Lankan Tamils from Indian refugee camps
to Sri Lanka.81 However, political fallouts and the violence of the war marred
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separate Tamil state in the Jaffna peninsula, the traditional homeland for Tamils, called
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Chowdhory (n 64); Rotberg (n 64); Fair (n 64).
Rotberg (n 64).
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Economic and Political Weekly 2365; however, the term “repatriates” is somewhat misleading
because neither Indian nor Sri Lankan governments considered their choices in the repatriation process. Interestingly enough, repatriates also distance themselves from Camp-Refugees.
Ostensibly, they wish to dissociate from the poverty and the ad-hoc way of life in the camps.
Instead, repatriates’ narratives in studies focus on resettlement into “respectable” neighbourhoods in Chennai and normalcy in everyday life, for instance, visiting Sri Lanka using
their Indian passports like regular citizens as in Anne-Sophie Bentz and Anthony GoreauPonceaud, ‘To be or not to be a Refugee? Reflections on Refugeehood and Citizenship among
Sri Lankan Tamils in India’ [2020] 24 Citizenship Studies 176.
Chowdhory (n 64); Bentz and Goreau-Ponceaud (n 79); Pavithra Jayawardena ‘Sri Lankan
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101; Himanshi Raizada, ‘Sri Lankan refugees in India: The Problem and the Uncertainty’
[2013] 1 International Journal of Peace and Development 1.
Urmila Phadnis, ‘The Indo-Ceylon Pact and the “Stateless” Indians in Ceylon’ [1967] 7
Far Eastern Survey 226; Urmila Phadnis and Lalit Kumar, ‘The Sirimavo-Shastri Pact of
1964: Problems and Prosects of Implementation’ [1975] 31 India Quarterly: A Journal of
International Affairs 249.
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these efforts.82 Further, Sri Lanka has tried to domestically alleviate Estate
Tamils’ statelessness through various laws passed in 1986, 1988, 2003 (“2003
Grant of Citizenship Act”) and 2009.83 Some of these laws witnessed limited
success due to onerous procedural requirements,84 loss of documentation by
civilians in the wake of the war,85 and the prevailing socio-political climate.86
However, the 2003 Grant of Citizenship Act was a notable exception
since it successfully resolved statelessness for 190,000 Estate Tamils in Sri
Lanka.87 The success of the 2003 Grant of Citizenship Act lies in its simplified procedure of granting citizenship and collaboration with the UNHCR
along with local stakeholders.88 Sri Lanka earned immense praise for alleviating its statelessness problem from the UNHCR, which called the 2003 Grant
of Citizenship Act a “turning point” in Sri Lanka’s history.89 Unfortunately,
India has not yet followed suit in demonstrating political willingness to reduce
statelessness for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees.

III. INDIAN CITIZENSHIP LAW AND THE
“ILLEGAL MIGRANT” QUESTION
A. Framework of Indian citizenship laws
Understanding citizenship law in India requires an understanding of both
citizenship laws and the immigration regime.90 Collectively, this set of laws
distinguishes between insiders or citizens, and outsiders or non-citizens.91
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accessed 28 July 2021.
Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Act 1986; Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons
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Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Act 1986, s 3; Indo-Ceylon Agreement
(Implementation) Act 1967.
Wolozin (n 6).
To illustrate some socio-political events, India intervened in the civil war with the Indian
Peacekeeping Force, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by an LTTE member, Sri Lankan leadership changed with a fresh general election as in Chimni (n 7); Chowdhory (n 64); Dasgupta (n
79).
Chetani Wijetuna, ‘Feature: Sri Lanka makes citizens out of stateless tea pickers’ (UNHCR
India, 7 October 2004) <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2004/10/416564cd4/feature-sri-lanka-makes-citizens-stateless-tea-pickers.html> accessed 28 July 2021.
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The first source for consideration is the Indian Constitution.92 The
Constituent Assembly drafted constitutional provisions of citizenship, keeping
in mind the most pressing issue of the time – the Partition of India at independence.93 To illustrate, Article 5 confers birth based citizenship only to
those who were alive at the time of the commencement of the Constitution.94
Similarly, Articles 6 and 7 deal only with migrants moving to or from India
on account of Partition.95 The Constituent Assembly also inserted Article 11
to empower the Parliament to make citizenship laws based on India’s needs
beyond independence.96
The second source is the primary law on citizenship in India, the
Citizenship Act, 1955 (“1955 Act”), enacted by the Parliament in pursuance of
Article 11.97 Under the 1955 Act, there are five modes prescribed for acquiring
Indian citizenship, namely, by birth,98 by descent,99 through registration,100 by
naturalisation,101 and through India incorporating new territory.102
The third and equally crucial source is India’s immigration regime that governs non-citizens. The Foreigners Act, 1946 (“1946 Act”)103 is a colonial era
legislation that focuses on the entry and exit of foreigners from India based
on the possession of legal documents like passports, visas, entry or exit permits. These documents are obtained under the Passports Act, 1967,104 and the
Passports Rules, 1980.105
Alternatively, foreigners can seek temporary or permanent visas from
the Indian government under the Long-Term Visa Guidelines (“LTV
Guidelines”).106 A long-term visa (“LTV”) is particularly attractive because it
opens up avenues to other rights, like obtaining education, identity cards and
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1949)
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volume/9/1949-08-10> accessed 28 July 2021; in this vein, Bhatia claims that in effect, the
Constitution tells us “nothing” about citizenship as in Bhatia (n 51).
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Constitution of India 1950, arts 6 and 7.
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1955 Act, s 3.
1955 Act, s 4.
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Foreigners Act 1946.
Passports Act 1967.
Passports Rules 1980.
Ministry of Home Affairs, Guidelines for Long Term Visa <https://www.mha.gov.in/PDF_
Other/AnnexVI_01022018.pdf> accessed 28 July 2021 (“Long-Term Visa Guidelines”).
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housing on an interim basis.107 The LTV Guidelines also allow applications
from applicants fearing persecution in a manner that mirrors the language of
the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (“1951
Convention”).108 LTVs can also be used to apply for Indian citizenship through
registration or naturalisation.109
Since India is not a party to the 1951 Convention, the 1954 Convention or
the 1961 Convention, and also does not have a domestic law on refugees or
stateless persons, the government governs the presence of these groups through
the LTV Guidelines.110 The absence of this recognition under an official legislation is significant, considering that in 2021, India housed as many as 208,065
refugees, many of whom are also stateless like the Sri Lankan Tamils.111 Data
from the Ministry of Home Affairs indicates that out of the total refugee population, over 94,000 are Sri Lankan Tamil refugees alone, with 59,506 of them
living in camps, and 35,000 living outside of camps.112
In the absence of a specific targeted law, refugees and stateless persons are
sent into a common immigration system with foreigners, and governed through
the state’s political and administrative set-ups under the 1946 Act.113 The 1946
Act comes into play here since it does not differentiate the intent of different
groups of foreigners entering India. As Bhairav Acharya highlights, tourists,
refugees and migrants have varied reasons for entering India.114 However, since
the 1946 Act is agnostic to these differences, it makes refugees and stateless
persons vulnerable to detention, trial or deportation.115
107
108
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Therefore, the state’s approach to refugees and stateless persons is subject
to a reorientation of political will, the identity of the individual in question,
and the prevailing socio-political climate.116 To illustrate, the Indian State
metes differential treatment over time depending on the incumbent government
– although it welcomed Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in the 1980s, the current
government has not accorded similar treatment for the Rohingyas.117 Various
reports by human rights organisations and media forums have also documented
that the Indian State has consistently pressured foreigners to prove their identity, confined suspected foreigners in camps, and ordered deportations under
the 1946 Act.118
To compound the problems under the 1946 Act, courts have been overly
deferential in creating safeguards against the 1946 Act. For instance, in the
cases of Hans Muller,119 and Louis de Raedt,120 the SC declared that the 1946
Act confers unfettered discretion to the government to expel foreigners. The
positions taken in Hans Muller and Louis de Raedt have consistently been
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Kai Schultz, ‘As India Clamps Down on Migration, Millions May Lose Citizenship’ (The
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reiterated by courts, firmly entrenching the unfettered discretion of the state in
dealing with foreigners as the law of the land.121
Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, too, have fallen prey to the draconian provisions of the 1946 Act. The Tamil Nadu government has passed notifications
under the 1946 Act directing that Sri Lankan Tamil refugees cannot move
outside refugee camps, and must obtain permission from the Collector to do
so.122 In persistent attempts to break free from this restriction, Sri Lankan
Tamil refugees have filed numerous petitions challenging such notifications.123
However, courts have reiterated Hans Muller and Louis de Raedt in saying that
the 1946 Act confers unfettered discretion on the government for dealing with
foreigners.124
Unfortunately, international law can provide little respite to refugees and
stateless persons in India.125 Although India is a party to the covenants on
civil and political rights126 and economic, social and cultural rights,127 they are
enforceable in India to a limited extent.128 India has not made a meaningful
121
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1996 Mad 322; Tasleem Murad v Govt of AP 2002 SCC OnLine AP 738 : (2002) 5 ALD
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attempt towards formulating adequate policy level responses for the issues
faced by refugees or stateless persons resident in its territory.129

B. Foundational shifts in Indian citizenship: The illegal migrant
issue
Traditionally, there have been two categories in citizenship law – citizens
and non-citizens. While the 1955 Act deals with the former category for granting, revoking and renouncing citizenship, the 1946 Act focuses on the entry
and exit of the latter by inquiring if such foreigners possess the requisite legal
documents.130 However, the creation of a third category of the ‘illegal migrant’
has thrown a spanner in the works, by blurring the distinction between citizenship law and immigration law.131 Under Indian law, an illegal migrant is a
foreigner who has entered India without valid documents, or one who stays in
India beyond the time permitted by travel documents.132
The category of the illegal migrant was initially created to address the specificities of the Assam Accord.133 However, incremental amendments to citizenship law have introduced the category of the illegal migrant for general
determinations of citizenship outside of Assam as well.134
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ibid.
1955 Act, s 2 (1) (b).
The creation of ‘illegal migrant’ in citizenship law was a response to the Assam Accord,
however, a detailed study of citizenship issues in Assam and the Assamese NRC exercise
is beyond the scope of this paper, see Ram (n 30); Rahman (n 118); Sarbananda Sonowal
v Union of India (2005) 5 SCC 665 : AIR 2005 SC 2920; Assam Public Works v Union of
India, (2019) 9 SCC 70; Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v Union of India (2015) 3 SCC 1;
Chetna Sharma, ‘Citizenship Amendment Bill 2016: continuities and contestations with
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‘National Register of Citizens and the Supreme Court’ [2018] 53 Economic and Political
Weekly 10; Shahnawaz Malik ‘Future of Citizenship Laws in India With Special Reference to
Implementation of NRC in Assam’ [2020] 6/4 Journal of Legal Studies and Research <https://
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The second impact of this new category has been through the effect of the
Foreigners Tribunals (“FT”)135, which deals with suspected foreigners.136 As
Anubhav Tiwari and Prashant Singh highlight, the FT embarked on a mission
that was markedly different from the original intent of the 1946 Act. Instead
of simply regulating the entry and exit of identified foreigners, the FTs now
make determinations about the legality of suspected foreigners’ presence in
India. Such a determination by the FT is based either by the suspected foreigners demonstrating the possession of valid legal documents to justify their presence in India, or by proving that they are Indian citizens.137 Since foreigners
are defined as “persons who are not citizens of India”, and illegal migrants are
foreigners who have entered India without valid legal documents, the determination of one’s status as a foreigner or an illegal migrant inherently also carries
a determination of whether or not they are a citizen.138
However, the consequence of being declared one of these two categories is
strikingly different – while being declared a foreigner makes one eligible for
deportation, being declared an illegal migrant disqualifies one or their children from acquiring Indian citizenship. Although the FTs have not affected
Sri Lankan Tamil refugees directly yet,139 they have created a jurisprudential
shift by legitimising the inquiry into the citizenship status of anyone the State
chooses, and blurring the demarcation between citizenship law and immigration law.140
The category of ‘illegal migrant’ was first introduced in the 1955 Act
through an amendment in 2004 (“2004 Amendment”).141 The 2004 Amendment
marked a sea change in citizenship law since it introduced a third, in-between
135
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(2020).
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category of illegal migrants.142 Post the 2004 Amendment, persons born on or
after January 26, 1950 but before July 1, 1987 are citizens by the simple fact of
birth in India.143 Next, persons born in India on or after July 1, 1987 but before
January 1, 2004 are citizens if either of their parents was an Indian citizen
at the time of their birth.144 Finally, persons born on or after January 1, 2004
are citizens only if neither of their parents is an illegal migrant at the time of
their birth.145 Furthermore, the 1955 Act now also disqualifies persons who fall
under the category of illegal migrant from obtaining citizenship by naturalisation or registration.146
To identify and deport such illegal migrants, the Citizenship (Registration
of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003 (“2003 Rules”)
were amended to initiate the preparation of an NRC.147 The bleak future that
may lie ahead with the country-wide implementation of the 2003 Rules appears
to be foreshadowed by the Assam NRC exercise. Since the publication of the
Assam NRC’s final list, the first formal exercise of this nature,148 it has been
heavily criticised by domestic and international commentators for rendering 19
million persons stateless.149 Further, the numerous egregious errors resulting in
142
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Mine’ (Heinrich Böll India, 31 January 2020) <https://in.boell.org/en/2020/01/31/land-mine>
accessed 28 July 2021; Sangeeta Barooah, ‘Women Without Parents: An NRC Ground Report’
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exclusions from the NRC150 have forced the government to re-think a pan-India
NRC.151
Following the 2004 Amendment, the next major step was a notification
brought by the Central Government (“2015 Amendment”) to exempt certain
classes of foreigners from deportation.152 The most striking aspect of the eligibility requirements under the 2015 Amendment is its specific reference to religious identity.153 Before the 2015 Amendment, religion-based bias was evident
in Articles 6 and 7 of the Indian Constitution, and in the examination of one’s
parents’ citizenship status for birth-based citizenship,154 a thinly veiled inquiry
into the religion of the applicant under the Citizenship Act.155 With the 2015
Amendment, Indian citizenship laws were slowly shedding religion-neutrality
in favour of actively protecting specific communities.
More recently, the 2019 Act was passed to exempt specific categories of
individuals from being categorised as illegal migrants.156 To qualify under the
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2019 Act, individuals must be Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, or Christian
who entered India on or before December 31, 2014, and from Afghanistan,
Bangladesh or Pakistan.157
The 2019 Act adds a third layer to the complexities of Indian citizenship
law. This is because first, one must look at the entire set of laws governing
Indian citizenship law; second, identify if they can be categorised as illegal
migrants; and third, identify if they can be exempt from such classification as
an illegal migrant under the 2019 Act based on, inter alia, religious identity. If
one falls within the ambit of the 2019 Act, they will not be an illegal migrant
and hence not be disqualified from Indian citizenship.158 However, persons
ineligible under the 2019 Act, as the Sri Lankan Tamils, are disqualified from
acquiring Indian citizenship.159
Numerous scholars have levelled severe criticism against the validity
of the 2019 Act.160 Further, several petitions have been lodged before Indian
courts, raising crucial questions like the constitutionality of the 2019 Act,161
federalism,162 and police brutality at “anti-CAA” protests163 emanating from
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the implementation of the 2019 Act.164 Despite the propensity of backlash,
curiously enough, the SC has been dragging its feet in hearing the petitions
regarding the 2019 Act.165 Most significantly, the SC has refused to place
a stay on the 2019 Act before allowing the Central Government to provide a
response.166
One of the key questions critics level against the 2019 Act is its selective
protection to specific groups.167 Although the ostensible intent of the 2019
Act is to protect refugees fleeing persecution,168 it does so through several illfounded assumptions.169
First, it assumes that religious persecution is confined to countries whose
state religion is Islam.170 In contrast, Sri Lankan Tamils faced religious persecution in a non-Islamic state.171 It also seems to believe that only Islamic countries engage in persecution, especially religious persecution. This belief follows
the savage-victim-saviour narrative, which portrays India as the saviour for
non-Muslims from savage Muslim ‘foreigners’.172
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Indian Union of Muslim League (n 164).
Chakrabarty (n 28); Ahmed argues that the 2019 Act fails the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness under Article 14 as in Farrah Ahmed, ‘Arbitrariness, Subordination and Unequal
Citizenship’ [2020] 4 Indian Law Review 121.
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Second, the 2019 Act assumes the absence of intra-religious persecution.
For instance, Ahmediyyas and Balochis are Muslims but face religious persecution in Pakistan.173 Third, unlike the 1951 Convention,174 the 2019 Act identifies persecution solely on religion.175 However, South Asia is rife with other
forms of persecution as well; for instance, Tibetans in China faced political
persecution.176 Unsurprisingly, the Indian state has hitherto failed to convince
the entire populace regarding the utility of the 2019 Act, given its inability to
address the needs of refugee groups who are excluded from its ambit.177
Finally, the LTV Guidelines were amended to mirror the 2019 Act, defining eligible applicants along religious lines.178 Interestingly, the LTV Guidelines
also create additional benefits to eligible applicants like allowances to move
freely in most parts of the country,179 get Permanent Account Number cards
(required for Indian income tax purposes) and Aadhar numbers (necessary
for identification purposes and availing government as well as certain private
services).180 Most crucially, possession of LTV allows the holder to apply for
Indian citizenship under the 1955 Act.181
The Ministry of Home Affairs claims that under its policy, groups like
Sri Lankan Tamils who have been left out of the LTV Guidelines can claim
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Iftikhar Malik, ‘Religious Minorities in Pakistan’ (Minority Rights Group International 2002)
<https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/469cbfc30.pdf> accessed 28 July 2021.
Chandrachud highlights that best international practices for recognising refugees follow
the 1951 Convention, which asks states to recognise refugees irrespective of ‘race, religion,
nationality or membership of a particular social group or political opinion’. Assuming India
had been a signatory to the 1951 Convention, it would have fallen foul of the requirement to
not make a religion-based classification for refugees as in Chandrachud (n 27).
In this vein, Chandrachud compellingly argues that the 2019 Act also contravenes Article 14
due to its religion-based classification as in Chandrachud (n 27).
Ramachandra ha, ‘Home and the World’ in Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi (Picador
2008); Free Tibet, ‘Tibet’s history’ <https://freetibet.org/about/history> accessed 28 July 2021.
Suparna Chaudhry, ‘India’s New Law may Leave Millions of Muslims without Citizenship’
(The Washington Post, 13 December 2019) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/13/indias-new-law-may-leave-millions-muslims-without-citizenship/>accessed 28
July 2021.
Long-Term Visa Guidelines, s 1(A) (The new requirements make the following categories eligible for LTV: first, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, or Christian individuals
from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan. Second, Pakistani or Bangladeshi women and
Afghanistan nationals married to Indian nationals and staying in India. Third, Indian origin women with Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Afghanistan nationality and without supporting
male members wishing to return due to widowhood or divorce. Fourth, cases of extreme
compassion.)
Free movement does not include movement in protected, restricted and cantonment areas as in
Long-Term Visa Guidelines, s 1 (H)(b).
Long-Term Visa Guidelines, s 1 (H)(a), s 1 (H)(b)
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refugee status and apply separately for an LTV.182 However, granting of LTVs
is wholly subject to government discretion, which means the absence of certainty of procedure or a guaranteed right for applicants. Further, the number of
LTVs granted per year remains unclear, since different ministries have released
inconsistent figures over time.183 Consequently, we do not have much information on the policy and practice of the government’s considerations while granting LTVs. Thus, the LTV Guidelines provide little relief to refugees who are
not categorically included within their scope, including Sri Lankan Tamils.

C. The question of jus sanguinis citizenship
1. Jus sanguinis as an alternate basis for Indian citizenship
The trajectory of amendments discussed above shows the growing importance of one’s status as an illegal migrant in acquiring Indian citizenship.
There are two noteworthy facts about this transition: first, a move towards
examining the citizenship of a person’s ascendants; and second, a departure
from religious-neutrality to actively using religion for citizenship determination.184 Both these prongs indicate a shift in Indian citizenship law towards a
jus sanguinis model.185 To contextualise the repercussions of a potential jus
sanguinis citizenship in India, it is imperative to understand the pitfalls of jus
sanguinis along with the character of Indian citizenship law – is it jus soli or
jus sanguinis in nature?
At the outset, it is useful to understand the differences between the two
models. Numerous scholars argue that jus sanguinis is an exclusionary form
of citizenship, whereas jus soli is an inclusive model.186 This is because jus soli
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28 July 2021.
Vijaita Singh, ‘Figures for Long-term Visas to Minorities don’t Add Up’ (The Hindu, 20
January 2019) <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/figures-for-long-term-visas-to-minorities-dont-add-up/article26043881.ece> accessed 28 July 2021.
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David Weissbrodt, ‘The human rights of stateless persons’ [2006] 28 Human Rights Quarterly
245; other scholars highlight that there is no necessary connection between jus sanguinis
citizenship and statelessness as in Kristin Collins, ‘Abolishing Ius Sanguinis Citizenship: A
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confers citizenship on the simple fact of birth on a territory.187 In contrast, jus
sanguinis may exclude persons born in or residing in the territory of a state
who lack shared ethnic characteristics or fail to draw their lineage from that
state.188 In this way, persons ineligible for want of ethnic features or lineage in
States following jus sanguinis are unable to claim citizenship in such States.189
Alternatively, if States transition from jus soli to jus sanguinis, persons initially eligible for citizenship under jus soli may lose their citizenship under jus
sanguinis.190 Further, persons rendered stateless under such jus sanguinis law
will reproduce statelessness for their descendants, creating ‘multigenerational
statelessness’.191 Thus, jus sanguinis citizenship has a powerful potential to
exacerbate statelessness.
Indian citizenship is experiencing all of these phenomena – the law is shedding jus soli character in favour of jus sanguinis as evinced by the amendments of 2004, 2015 and 2019.192 As a result, children of parents who are
stateless or doubtful citizens have been rendered stateless will probably pass
on their lack of citizenship to the next generation, creating multigenerational
statelessness. Further, refugees and stateless persons who are not exempt from
being categorised as illegal migrants under the 2019 Act will continue to live
without citizenship.193
India’s Constituent Assembly was cognisant of the pitfalls of jus sanguinis
as well, and intentionally eschewed jus sanguinis in favour of jus soli,194 hop187
188
189

190
191
192
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ing to lay the foundation of a pluralist, secular democracy.195 This decision is
interesting when juxtaposed with colonial imaginations that pitted Hindus
against Muslims as separate nations; an idea that crystallised in the ‘two-nation’ theory196 most famously propagated by M.A. Jinnah.197
Building on the two-nation theory that India was a ‘homeland for Hindus’,198
some Constituent Assembly members argued for Indian citizenship to favour
Hindus and Sikhs.199 The ‘homeland for Hindus’ notion has seen a modern
resurgence in independent India, most strikingly with the rise to power of the
Bharatiya Janata Party.200 As a result, recent governmental policies, including
the reconceptualisation of citizenship law, have sought to address otherwise
“neglected” Hindu interests.201
195
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Some revisionist arguments to Indian citizenship, most prominently by
Abhinav Chandrachud,202 have attempted to provide an explanation to the modern resurgence of the ‘homeland for Hindus’ idea. Chandrachud submits that
the 2019 Act is merely an extension of the Constituent Assembly’s debates at
the time of and following Partition.203 In a nutshell, Chandrachud argues that
the permit system204 enshrined in Articles 6 and 7 of the Indian Constitution
created differential pathways to Indian citizenship for Hindu and Muslim
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migrants; specifically, the permit system allowed easier access to Hindus but
created a disadvantage for Muslim migrants seeking Indian citizenship.205 He
highlights that the differential requirements for citizenship was not an accident but an intentional design – the Constituent Assembly was aware of, and
actively used, the difference in faith among migrants to encourage citizenship
for Hindus and discourage it for Muslims.206
Thus, although the text of the Indian Constitution does not mention religion
in terms of citizenship requirements, its consequence was to develop a divergent approach for Hindu and Muslim migrants. There was no formal discrimination based on religion, but the result of the law was the creation of a major
disadvantage for Muslim refugees.207
In this backdrop, as Niraja Gopal Jayal argues, Indian citizenship law has
experienced a tension in conceiving itself as jus soli or jus sanguinis beginning
from Constituent Assembly debates around and arising out of Partition.208 This
tension has reproduced itself in independent India through the slew of amendments that seek to topple jus soli and replace it with jus sanguinis citizenship
– primarily by making Indian citizenship increasingly contingent on the applicant not being an illegal migrant.209
N. Ram and Gautam Bhatia caution against overemphasising revisionist
arguments that try to characterise Indian citizenship as inherently non-secular
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India, and subject to veto by the Indian state where the Muslim migrant wished to resettle
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Chandrachud (n 27); in contemporary times, this consequence-based test has been recognised in the context of Article 15 in Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1.
The SC held that it is not only whether a law bases its discrimination on one of the grounds
mentioned in Article 15, for instance, sex. Instead, the real test is whether the effect of
such classification results in discrimination. Using this idea, we can examine Articles 6 and
7 through their effects – creating differential pathways to citizenship based on religion and
creating a disadvantage for Muslim migrants. This consequence-based test has also been
discussed in Rani Raj Rajeshwari Devi v State of UP 1954 SCC OnLine All 90 : AIR 1954
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and non-discriminatory.210 They concede that the ‘homeland for Hindus’ arguments were voiced in the Constituent Assembly and that the permit system has
unsecular foundations,211 but remind us that the ultimate form of Indian citizenship which the Constituent Assembly ultimately adopted was birth-based
and non-discriminatory.212 Further, they highlight that the Partition was an
exceptional moment of determining citizenship, which should not be used as a
bright-line test for determining contemporary Indian citizenship.213
In particular, Bhatia argues that Chapter II should be read in conjunction
with constitutional provisions like equality, non-discrimination, safeguarding
of minority rights, and secularism.214 For Ram and Bhatia, then, Indian citizenship does, has and will continue to signify a pluralist and secular form of
citizenship.215
The inquiry into religious identity and descent as spearheaded by the ‘illegal migrant’ question in citizenship law promises to create, or deepen, rifts in
India. It creates a precarious situation for persons belonging to religious minorities, revives a ‘homeland for Hindus’ notion of India and places the rights of
its resident refugees and stateless persons at risk. Thus, it is imperative for
India to remind itself of the pluralist and secular ideals it was born with, particularly for determining Indian citizenship. Although there have been disagreements over whether jus soli or jus sanguinis form the rightful foundations
of Indian citizenship, it is imperative for us to advocate and practice for a jus
soli-based Indian citizenship; this is because jus soli complements the plurality
of India as a nation, and protects persons born in its soil irrespective of their
parents’ citizenship status. Thus, stateless persons like Sri Lankan Tamil refugees can acquire citizenship through a model based on jus soli citizenship.216
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Discussed infra in Part IV.
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2. Right to have rights and jus sanguinis citizenship for Sri Lankan
Tamils
The question that remains unanswered now is: has the shift towards jus
sanguinis citizenship in India caused Sri Lankan Tamil refugees to realise
Arendt’s conception of the right to have rights? This section attempts to answer
this question in the context of Camp-Refugees.217
At first glance, it seems that the right to have rights does not apply to the
citizenship status of Camp-Refugees. First and most significantly, CampRefugees hold a profound cultural and linguistic affinity with the Indian population of Tamil Nadu. Nasreen Chowdhory argues that through this sense
of “belonging”218 with the host population, Camp-Refugees can claim India’s
rightful membership.219 In other words, Camp-Refugees need not confine themselves to seeking rights based on nationality.
Second, there are growing instances of decoupling rights and citizenship.220 In today’s world, merely belonging to a community may not mean
being a politico-legal member and vice versa.221 Anne-Sophie Bentz and
Anthony Goreau-Ponceaud specifically illustrate this disaggregation of rights
from citizenship by contrasting Camp-Refugees with the urban poor who are
formally Indian citizens.222 Bentz and Goreau-Ponceaud argue that despite formal citizenship, the urban poor receive scant State assistance.223 Similarly, D
Parthasarathy argues that formal citizenship has not guaranteed substantive
rights for marginalised groups like Adivasis and Dalits.224
217
218

219
220

221

222
223
224

Estate Tamils in India already hold Indian citizenship.
‘…nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and
duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual …
is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than
with that of any other State.’ as proclaimed in Liechtenstein v Guatemala [1955] ICJ Rep 4.
This test is also known as the ‘genuine link’ test or the ‘social fact of attachment’ to a country as put by the International Court of Justice, see generally Audrey Macklin ‘Is it Time to
Retire Nottebohm?’ [2017] 111 American Journal of International Law Unbound 492.
Chowdhory (n 5) ; Chowdhory (n 64).
Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in
Europe (University of Chicago Press 1994); Nira Yuval-Davis, The Politics of Belonging:
Intersectional Contestations (Sage Publications 2011); Seyla Benhabib, ‘“The right to have
rights”: Hannah Arendt on the Contradictions of the Nation-state’ in Seyla Benhabib, The
Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge University Press 2004).
Lamarr (n 35); Brubaker (n 43); Chowdhory (n 64); Soysal (n 220); Yuval-Davis (n 220);
Benhabib (n 220); Patrick Balazo, ‘Better Must Come: Citizenship and Belonging after
Statelessness’ [2019] 1 Statelessness and Citizenship Review 5
Bentz and Goreau-Ponceaud (n 79).
ibid.
D. Parathasarthy, ‘Citizenship (Amendment) Act: The Pitfalls of Homogenising Identities in
Resistance Narratives’ [2020] 55 EPW Engage; this argument has been made specifically in
relation to the 2019 Act as well as in Suraj Yengde, ‘The Anti-Dalit, Anti-Adivasi Features
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In contrast, Camp-Refugees are given considerable benefits by the Central
and Tamil Nadu governments. Camp-Refugees receive free medical services,
food, water supply, utensils, clothing, electricity and monthly doles.225 There
has been an incremental expansion in benefits over the years such as free
colour TVs schemes, allowance for funeral expenses and sports equipment,
issuance of driving licence among others.226 These measures indicate that
Camp-Refugees enjoy a relatively decent condition of life in India despite lacking formal citizenship.227 In this way, Bentz and Goreau-Ponceaud contend that
refugee status can be more beneficial than formal citizenship.228
However, taking a holistic picture of Camp-Refugees’ reveals that their
lives are much more complicated. First, although government measures
seem generous on paper, there are significant gaps in their implementation
on the ground.229 For instance, refugee children were for long confined to
camp schools because they did not have certificates to be admitted into regular ones.230 Although this situation has improved slightly for primary education, seeking higher education continues to be an arduous process for
Camp-Refugees231 In several cases, Camp-Refugees’ educational qualifications
are not recognised in India.232 As a result, their employment opportunities are
severely restricted, and they must resort to menial jobs or self-employment like
shops selling vegetables and everyday items.233
There are also numerous instances of corruption in camps, for example, in accessing the rations.234 It is difficult for poor Camp-Refugees to meet
these demands for bribes. Further, living conditions in camps are grim. Poor
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of the 2020 Indian Citizenship Amendment Act’ (Political and Legal Anthropology Review,
7 September 2020) <https://polarjournal.org/2020/09/07/the-anti-dalit-anti-adivasi-features-ofthe-2020-indian-citizenship-amendment-act/> accessed 28 July 2021.
Chimni (n 5).
Department of Rehabilitation Tamil Nadu Government, ‘Information Handbook under the
Right to Information Act 2005’ <https://www.tn.gov.in/rti/proactive/public/handbook_rehabilitation.pdf> accessed 28 July 2021.
Chimni notes that factions of the local population resent the Camp-Refugees for this ‘preferential’ treatment as in Chimni (n 5).
Bentz and Goreau-Ponceaud (n 79).
Irudaya Rajan and C Valatheeswaran, ‘Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in India: Rehabilitation
Mechanisms, Livelihood Strategies and Lasting Solutions’ [2011] 30 Refugee Survey
Quarterly 24.
Chimni (n 7).
Vinodh Arulappan, ‘With Poor Conditions in Camps, Sri Lankan Tamils Remain Citizens of
No-man’s Land’ (The Indian Express, 22 December 2019) <https://www.newindianexpress.
com/states/tamil-nadu/2019/dec/22/with-poor-conditions-in-camps-sri-lankan-tamils-remaincitizens-of-no-mans-land-2079412.html> accessed 28 July 2021.
Chimni (n 5); I Jothi Gandhi v Social Welfare Development Office 2014 SCC OnLine Mad
8861 wherein the petitioner was denied retirement benefits because his employer claimed that
the petitioner’s Sri Lankan educational documents did not meet the requisite criteria.
Chimni (n 7); Rajan and Valatheeswaran (n 229).
Chowdhory (n 64).
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sanitation and inadequate toilet facilities in camps lead to dirty septic tanks,
overflowing drains, common bouts of typhoid, malaria and diarrhoea.235
Government hospitals are located at a distance and Camp-Refugees notably face discrimination, even if they can reach them,236 and even then there
are no mental health facilities available to them.237 Finally, camp facilities are
unevenly distributed such that some have all amenities whereas others have
none.238 Women are especially vulnerable to sexual assault, loss of material
possessions, are tormented by the inability to feed their children, and disproportionately burdened with recreating a familial environment in camps.239
The most significant want for Camp-Refugees is of addressing their lack of
mobility, since they cannot move outside the camps freely.240 Camp-Refugees
concede that although the government has undertaken generous measures,
they do not have “normal” lives like citizens.241 For Camp-Refugees, normalcy would manifest in transport facilities, identity documents or resources
to move outside the camps.242 As mentioned above, Indian courts have recognised the government’s unfettered right to restrict refugee movement by echoing the legal positions taken in Hans Muller and Louis de Raedt. Further,
Camp-Refugees have often been suspected of having ties with the LTTE,243
and been detained in special LTTE camps,244 opening them up to increased
interactions with the police, prisons and penalties.245 Picking up from Bentz
235
236
237

238
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240
241
242
243
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ibid.
ibid.
Neeraja Sanmuhanathan ‘Tamil Women in the Home Away from Home: The Impact of
War Trauma on Psychological Wellbeing’ in Niro Kandasamy and others (ed) A Sense of
Viidu: The (Re)creation of Home by the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Australia (Palgrave
Macmillan 2020); Miriam George, ‘Sri Lankan Tamil Refugee Experiences: A Qualitative
Analysis’ [2013] 6 International Journal of Culture and Mental Health 170.
Chimni (n 5).
Niro Kandasamy, ‘Memory and War: Tamil Women’s Experiences of Sri Lanka’s Civil War’
[2019] 42 Ethnic and Racial Studies 2661; Asha Hans, ‘Sri Lankan Tamil Refugee Women in
India’ [1997] 16 Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees 3; Judy Mayotte, Disposable People?
The Plight of Refugees (Orbis Books 1993).
1946 Act, s 3 (2) (e).
Chimni (n 5).
Chimni (n 5); Chowdhory (n 64).
As in Part II (b).
The Tamil Nadu government created special camps to detain LTTE supporters and cadres
as in 1946 Act, s 3 (2)(e); Arulinbathevar (n 115); Premavathy (n 121); Yogeswari v State of
TN 2003-1-LW(Crl) 352; Gnanaprakasam v Govt of TN 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 9001 : AIR
2015 Mad 65; Manoj v State of TN 1991 SCC OnLine Mad 605 : 1992 Cri LJ 2053; TNN,
‘7 Refugees Freed from Chengalpet Special Camp’ (The Times of India, 29 August 2012)
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/7-refugees-freed-from-Chengalpet-special-camp/articleshow/15909626.cms> accessed 28 July 2021.
Kalavathy (n 121); State v V. Jayachandra, (1997) 10 SCC 70; T. Udhayakala v Special
Deputy Collector, Mandapam Refugee Camp, (2018) 2 MLJ (Crl) 129; Sreekumar Kodiyath
and Sheethal Veetil, ‘Invisible People: Suspected LTTE Members in the Special Refugee
Camps of Tamil Nadu’ [2017] 36 Refugee Survey Quarterly 126; Baulah Shekhar and Vijaya
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and Goreau-Ponceaud’s discussion, mobility, freedom, and normalcy are features that the urban poor, Dalits, and Adivasis enjoy on paper whereas CampRefugees do not.246
Additionally, Camp-Refugees enjoy little to no rights compared to Indian
citizens. Notable exceptions are Articles 14 and 21 which apply to all persons
irrespective of citizenship.247 For instance, Camp-Refugees are not entitled to
civil and political rights like voting,248 holding office,249 freedom of speech,250
or equal access to public employment.251 Even for socio-economic aspects like
housing or food, they remain at the government’s mercy, or vulnerable to withdrawal of benefits on account of resource crunches.252
For instance, in Gnanaprakasam,253 the petitioner was a Camp-Refugee
invoking Article 21254 because his children’s engineering admission had been
rejected. The court responded by saying that educational or other concessions
for refugees were at the discretion of the State, which could not be claimed
as a matter of right. Further, the court explicitly stated that Camp-Refugees
should not try and claim equality of rights with citizens.255
This discussion finds that rights and citizenship are increasingly becoming disaggregated in India. Although ethnic belongingness promises access to
some rights through support from the State and the community, the continued
significance of formal citizenship lies over the Camp-Refugees since they cannot realise any rights in India. Thus, only formal Indian citizenship seems to
promise the secure presence of, and rights for, Camp-Refugees.
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Somasundaram ‘The Sri Lankan Refugee Crimes and Crisis: Experience and Lessons Learnt
from South India’ [2019] 2 Journal of Victimology and Victim Justice.
This discussion does not discount or minimise the hardships that the mentioned groups have
experienced in realizing their rights in India, and their socio-political exclusions from the
mainstream, and their erasure from public life; the intent is merely to indicate that formal citizenship can help in moving courts for realising rights, and that there is a mismatch of rights
with formal citizenship status. For instance, marginalised groups have found limited spaces
in mainstream politics through the campaign on the rights to food and to work by claiming
these rights by the fact of their citizenship as in Reetika Khera, Democratic Politics and Legal
Rights: Employment guarantee and food security in India, IEG Working Paper No 327 (2013).
See generally, Malischewski (n 13); Nicolas Jaoul and Alpa Shah, Beyond citizenship: Adivasi
and Dalit political pathways in India [2016] 76 Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical
Anthropology 3.
Constitution of India 1950, art 14, art 21; Louis De Raedt (n 120).
Representation of the People Act 1951, s 62.
Constitution of India 1950, art 58 (1)(a), art 66 (2); art 124 (3); art 217 (2); art 157.
Constitution of India 1950, art 19.
Constitution of India 1950, art 16.
Miriam George, ‘Sri Lankan Tamil Refugee Experiences: A Qualitative Analysis’ [2013] 6
International Journal of Culture and Mental Health 170.
Gnanaprakasam (n 244).
Constitution of India 1950, art 21.
Gnanaprakasam (n 244).
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IV. THE WAY FORWARD FOR INDIAN
CITIZENSHIP LAW AND SRI LANKAN
TAMIL REFUGEES’ CITIZENSHIP
A. Pathways to Indian citizenship for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees
At the outset, this section explores pathways to citizenship in the present scenario wherein Indian citizenship law continues to remain in a state of
flux. The contemporary instability in citizenship law has to do with the backlash against the 2019 Act, the SC’s decision on the future of the NRC and the
FTs, and the potential of legal recognition for stateless persons and refugees in
India. Thus, this paper recommends these pathways in the interim period for
Camp-Refugees till the government undertakes a holistic overhaul of citizenship law.256
There is no universal route to Indian citizenship for all Camp-Refugees.
This section provides pathways which may be explored to cater to the specificities of each group; first, Jaffna Tamils and Estate Tamils,257 and second, camp
children.258 In citizenship determination for Camp-Refugees, factors like their
nationality, possession of Sri Lankan citizenship and parents’ place of birth are
relevant.
First, Jaffna Tamils and Estate Tamils were not born in India and cannot
claim birthright citizenship.259 Second, most of the members of each group cannot seek citizenship by descent since their parents were Sri Lankan citizens.260
Third, from the date of the enactment of the 2004 Amendment, January 1,
2004, they cannot naturalise or register themselves as citizens because they are
considered illegal migrants.261 Fourth, they may apply as refugees fleeing religious persecution under the LTV Guidelines at the discretion of the State.262
256
257

258
259
260
261

262

Further recommendations are discussed infra in Part IV (c).
First, it is imperative to note the similarities and differences between Estate Tamils and Jaffna
Tamils, wherein the most significant difference is that the former are stateless, and the latter
are refugees in India. This is because several Jaffna Tamils hold Sri Lankan citizenship on
paper, but are refugees in India in light of the religious and linguistic persecution they faced.
However, Estate Tamils are divided; some are stateless, and others are Sri Lankan citizens.
Despite this difference between refugeehood and statelessness, Indian citizenship requirements for both groups are similar as in Chowdhory (n 64); Shastri (n 69); discussed in detail
in part II (b).
Since the ‘repatriates’ already hold Indian citizenship, this paper shall not discuss them.
1955 Act, s 3.
1955 Act, s 4.
1955 Act, s 5, s 6; Kakarala and others (n 8); this group includes those who married Indian
nationals.
Long-Term Visa Guidelines, s 5; for Jaffna Tamils, the persecution is the danger of the civil
war, whereas for Estate Tamils, the persecution includes the Ceylon Citizenship Act, 1948 and
the civil war.
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In considering children born in camps who are presently stateless, it is
imperative to note that their claims to birthright citizenship depends on their
date of birth.263 First, those born on or after January 26, 1950, and before July
1, 1987, are Indian citizens.264 Second, those born after July 1, 1987, but before
January 1, 2004 are Indian citizens if either parent was an Indian citizen at the
time of their birth.265 Similarly, registration of minors as citizens is contingent
on their parents being Indian citizens.266 Given that most parents of children
born in camps are refugees or stateless persons, it is unlikely that many children will be able to seek citizenship under this route.267
Third, children born after the commencement of the 2004 Amendment must
show that neither parent is an illegal immigrant at the time of their birth to
claim citizenship.268 Similarly, camp children seeking citizenship through naturalisation or registration must show that they are not illegal migrants.269 As
discussed above, Indian law conflates refugees with illegal migrants or foreigners, due to which Camp-Refugees continue to be categorised as foreigners or
illegal migrants.270 Since the parents are illegal migrants, the children of these
Camp-Refugees will be denied Indian citizenship by birth.271 Further, if the
children continue to live as illegal migrants in India, they will be disqualified
from Indian citizenship by naturalisation or registration.272
Thus, the jus sanguinis-based category of illegal migrants acts as a disqualification from Indian citizenship across the board for Camp-Refugees.273 In this
way, citizenship determination based on jus sanguinis results in statelessness,
particularly multigenerational statelessness.274
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The 1955 Act, unlike the 1961 Convention, does not provide that individuals born in India
who would otherwise be stateless are Indian citizens as in 1961 Convention, art 1. Further,
neither the 1955 Act nor the 2019 Act provide that a foundling found in a state shall be
deemed born in that territory as in 1961 Convention, art 2 as in Kakarala and others (n 8).
1955 Act, s 3 (1) (a); further, see infra Part IV (b).
1955 Act, s 3 (1) (b).
Citizenship Rules 2009, r 2 (c), r 3, sch I Form I (7).
Kakarala and others (n 8); Chandrachud (n 27).
1955 Act, s 3 (1)(c)(ii).
1955 Act, s 5, s 6.
Acharya (n 111).
1955 Act, s 3 (1)(b), 3 (1)(c).
Kakarala and others (n 8); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the
World’s refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (1997).
Kakarala and others (n 8).
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B. Role of courts in extending Indian citizenship for Sri Lankan
Tamil refugees
Rulings by Indian courts on citizenship issues of Camp-Refugees and stateless persons are a mixed bag. However, the role of courts is of paramount
importance in charting paths to inclusive citizenship generally, and specifically
for Camp-Refugees because the State has unfettered discretion in dealing with
these groups under present law.275
First, in Sasikumar,276 the Madras High Court (“HC”) held that a Sri Lankan
Tamil refugee born in India was a citizen under the 1955 Act since they were
born in India on March 10, 1987.277 In a similar vein, the noteworthy Namgyal
Dolkar decision held that children of Tibetan refugees born in India after
January 26, 1950, and before July 1, 1987, are Indian citizens by birth.278
Although these decisions seem like a stride forward for stateless persons’
citizenship in India by the court’s reading, a close reading of Section 3 reveals
that the petitioners in Sasikumar and Namgyal Dolkar were eligible for citizenship by the simple fact of their birth in India. The courts in both cases were
tasked with interpreting textbook illustrations of Section 3(1)(a), under which
all persons irrespective of all other factors (like the citizenship status of their
parents, religion of the applicant) are Indian citizens if they are born in India’s
territory after January 26, 1950, and before July 1, 1987.279 Section 3 only complicates requirements for persons born after July 1, 1987, by looking into one
As in Part III (a).
M Sasikumar v State of TN (2009) 5 Mad LJ 167.
277
1955 Act, s 3 (1) (a).
278
Namgyal Dolkar v Govt of India, Ministry of External Affairs 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4548 :
(2010)
12 DRJ 749; this stance has been followed by other HCs as well as in Tibetan Review, ‘Third
High Court in fourth case upholds Tibetans’ Indian citizenship status’ (15 March 2017)
<https://www.tibetanreview.net/third-high-court-in-fourth-case-upholds-tibetans-indian-citizenship-status/>; Namgyal Dolkar also received executive recognition in 2017 when the government allowed applications from Tibetan refugees born in India after January 26, 1950,
and before July 1, 1987, for Indian citizenship as in Phuntsok Wangyal v Ministry of External
Affairs 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5344 and Tenzin Passang v Union of India 2017 SCC OnLine
Del 12865 : (2017) 240 DLT 649; however, despite allowance for applications from Tibetan
refugees, the bureaucratic procedure was quite technical. Tibetan applicants had to abide by
certain conditions, including a prohibition on returning to original refugee settlements and
renouncing certain benefits in writing. These conditions discouraged many Tibetans from
applying because they wished to visit refugee settlements or could not afford to relinquish
governmental benefits. For instance, one refugee had to support her parents financially and
could not afford to live outside the refugee settlement. These executive impediments show that
court rulings by themselves are not sufficient for refugees to attain citizenship as in Abhinav
Seetharaman, ‘Tibetan refugees in India: The challenges of applying for Indian citizenship’
[2020] 54 Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines <http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/
ret/pdf/ret_54_05.pdf> accessed 28 July 2021.
279
1955 Act, s 3
275
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or both parents’ citizenship status.280 Thus far, courts have not provided meaningful relief for stateless persons seeking Indian citizenship.
Second, in Felix Kaye,281 the Delhi HC declared that the technical status of
a person being an illegal migrant does not bar the Indian government from
considering their application for citizenship. For the HC, even though a person
does not have valid travel documents at the time of entering India or such documents have expired, such person is eligible to apply for citizenship. Similarly,
in Kiran Gupta,282 and National Human Rights Commission (“NHRC”),283 the
courts held that stateless persons have the right to apply for Indian citizenship
which should be considered by the government. The striking aspect in Kiran
Gupta and NHRC is the courts’ cognisance of the petitioner’s statelessness, and
attempt to prompt the government to consider their applications for citizenship.
Third, in Ulaganathan,284 the Madras HC made two key findings. First, the
HC said that keeping refugees in campsites in a prolonged state of statelessness
is a contravention of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. This ruling is in
sharp contrast with the line of judgments that allowed the state unquestioned
discretion in keeping refugees in camps.285
Second, the court applied Felix Kaye specifically in the context of Sri
Lankan Tamils. In support of Felix Kaye’s ratio, the court stated that there are
compelling reasons for relaxing documentation requirements for refugees.286
The court reasoned that a person on the run for their life could not legitimately
be expected to adhere to technical provisions of the law. Further, in the court’s
opinion, if such person has integrated themselves sufficiently in local society,
they should be allowed to apply for formal citizenship.287
However, there is an important caveat to the Ulaganathan decision, wherein
the petitioner was a descendant of Estate Tamils,288 a point the judgment
paid special attention to.289 The court based its benevolent finding on the fact
that the petitioners’ forefathers hailed from Tamil Nadu itself. Thus, while
Ulaganathan’s application may be reserved for Estate Tamils wishing to apply
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Felix Kaye v Foreigners Regional Registration Office 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8212.
Kiran Gupta v State Election Commission 2020 SCC OnLine Pat 1641.
National Human Rights Commission v State of Arunachal Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 742 : AIR
1996 SC 1234 (“NHRC”).
P Ulaganathan v Govt. of India 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 8870 : AIR 2019 Mad 246
As discussed in Part III (a).
Ulaganathan (n 284).
ibid.
As in Part II (b).
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for citizenship, it seems to echo the logic of ethnic belongingness and descent
like recent amendments to citizenship laws.290
The positive takeaway that emerges from these rulings is that courts have
taken cognisance of statelessness in India, and have tried to nudge the government to proactively consider granting citizenship for such persons.291 Further,
invoking Article 21 in regard to stateless persons’ rights can be a route towards
reading in better rights for such groups. In the interim period, courts can crack
down on executive actions that prolong statelessness, and cast a positive obligation on the government to reduce statelessness by granting citizenship.
However, the downside to the judgments discussed above is that they have
made little headway in meaningfully lifting stateless persons and CampRefugees from their plight, and guide them onto a path for acquiring citizenship since they continue to place the decision in the hands of executive
discretion. In particular, the Madras HC invoked the idea that courts cannot
step beyond the “lakshmanrekha”292 and grant citizenship since that was the
domain of the government alone.293
Crucially, courts have also missed opportunities to deliberate on the impact
of the determination of whether an applicant or their parents is an illegal
migrant on alleviating or exacerbating statelessness. For this purpose, courts
can build on Felix Kaye’s holding that individuals who are on the run for their
lives or for similar genuine reasons cannot be expected to provide perfect documentation to apply for Indian citizenship. With this idea in mind, courts can
help break down the documentation-heavy citizenship determination process
that exists today.

C. The future of Indian citizenship law for stateless persons
It is evident that the abovementioned solutions provide only partial relief
for Camp-Refugees specifically, and stateless persons in India generally. In
light of this void, this paper proposes a number of general suggestions for the
future of Indian citizenship law that the government must give serious consideration. The need for India to take cognisance of its stateless population,
including Camp-Refugees cannot be overstated. In recent years, citizenship, or
the lack of it, has increasingly become a political weapon.294 When this threat
290
291

292
293
294

As in Part III.
Centre for Public Interest Law and others, ‘Excerpt: Legal Recognition of Status of
Statelessness in India’ (Parichay, 18 November 2020) <https://parichayblog.org/2020/11/18/
excerpt-legal-recognition-of-status-of-statelessness-in-india/>accessed 28 July 2021.
In modern Indian parlance, Lakshman Rekha is a bright-line rule or test.
Ulaganathan (n 284).
Sarker (n 125).
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is combined with the general precarity of being stateless, one can realise the
rights deprivation and insecurity that stateless persons in India experience on
a daily basis. Following the 1954 Convention and 1961 Convention, India must
shoulder the responsibility to reduce and prevent statelessness in its territory.295
At the outset, the government must take cognisance of stateless persons,
and compile comprehensive data on the number of stateless persons in India,296
which will not only help the government understand the extent and gravity of
the situation, but also facilitate legal professionals, academicians and humanitarian organisations who are willing to offer assistance.297
Second, the legislators must remove the bar on citizenship by registration
and naturalisation for persons who may be categorised as illegal migrants.298
This will allow Camp-Refugees, who are otherwise eligible to acquire citizenship through these modes, to overcome the barrier of being an ‘illegal
migrant’. Similar success has been noticed through Sri Lanka’s 2003 Grant of
Citizenship Act, which perfectly combined legal change with political willingness. This law either granted automatic Sri Lankan citizenship to Estate Tamils
or simplified procedures to help them acquire citizenship.299
Third, the legislator must lift the partial bar on citizenship by birth for persons whose parent or parents may be illegal migrants.300 This paper believes
that the law must specifically provide that individuals who are born in India
295
296

297
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299

300

ibid.
Kakarala and others (n 8); in 2014 and 2015, the government admitted that there were 102467
stateless persons and 101896 stateless persons respectively from Sri Lanka in India, whereas
in 2021, the government stated that the new figure was 92978 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees as in
Lok Sabha Unstarred Question 894 (2014) <http://164.100.24.220/loksabhaquestions/annex/7/
AU894.pdf>; Lok Sabha Unstarred Question 1360 <https://www.mha.gov.in/MHA1/Par2017/
pdfs/par2021-pdfs/LS-09022021/1360.pdf> accessed 28 July 2021.
Sunethra Sathyanarayanan, Creation of Statelessness in India: an Analysis of the Crisis
and the way Forward (The Peninsula, 27 August 2020) <https://www.thepeninsula.org.
in/2020/08/27/creation-of-statelessness-in-india-an-analysis-of-the-crisis-and-the-way-forward/>accessed 28 July 2021.
Centre for Public Interest Law: Jindal Global Law School, Securing citizenship: India’s legal
obligations towards precarious citizens and stateless persons (2020); 1954 Convention, art
32 provides that contracting parties should facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of
stateless persons and to expedite naturalisation proceedings; UNHCR, Draft articles on the
Protection of Stateless Persons and the Facilities for their Naturalisation (2017).
Estate Tamils who had no citizenship documents could make a “general declaration” countersigned by a justice of the peace which would act as proof of citizenship. alternatively, those
Estate Tamils with Indian passports could make a “special declaration” to renounce Indian
citizenship which was countersigned by the Commissioner for the Registration of Persons of
Indian Origin in Colombo and thereby acquire Sri Lankan citizenship since India does not
permit dual citizenship as in UNHCR 2015 (n 88).
Centre for Public Interest Law: Jindal Global Law School (n 298); 1961 Convention,art 1
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would otherwise be stateless.
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ought to be citizens if they would otherwise be rendered stateless.301 This
change will allow camp children born in India to acquire jus soli citizenship,
which will in turn prevent multigenerational statelessness.
Fourth, India must ratify the 1951 Convention, 1954 Convention, and the
1961 Convention, and also recognise and provide for stateless persons and refugees under domestic law.302 Such a move will provide stronger rights (like the
rights to reside or work) and safeguards for refugees and stateless persons, and
streamline the process for them to acquire Indian citizenship.303 In the meantime, the government must approve of applications from these groups under the
LTV Guidelines irrespective of, inter alia, religion.304
Fifth, the government must move away from its current stance of documentation-heavy determination of citizenship and contingent rights.305 While this
change is being effected through amendments, the government must conduct
nationwide camps for providing documentation to communities and regions
where they may be sparse, and raise awareness of the need for such documentation.306 Further, the State must provide legal aid to stateless persons and
refugees who are appearing before courts or FTs in lieu of immigration law
cases.307

V. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to study the currents of Indian citizenship law by
analysing various politico-legal developments in India and around the world,
particularly in the aftermath of World War II. In this regard, it has drawn upon
Arendt’s writings on citizenship, ethnicity and rights, and scrutinised the applicability of her idea of the ‘right to have rights’ for stateless Sri Lankan Tamil
refugees in India.
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Indian citizenship law has increasingly shrouded itself in jus sanguinis
citizenship, which determines insiders and outsiders based on shared ethnic identity. However, jus sanguinis as enshrined in amendments to the 1955
Act, and most recently in the 2019 Act, has a powerful potential to exacerbate
statelessness, or of preventing India from reducing the incidence of stateless
within its territory. One such effect that has been felt immediately with the
operation of the 2019 Act is fear among Sri Lankan Tamil refugees that they
will continue to live as stateless persons in India indefinitely or face deportation, and beget their lack of citizenship to their future generations.
Caught in a limbo between being insiders based on shared ethnicity with
Tamil Nadu, but being outsiders through the lack of formal citizenship, Sri
Lankan Tamils in Indian refugee camps have experienced a formidable extent
of Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’. Their experience is a searing reminder of the
continued importance of formal citizenship in accessing rights.
Indian citizenship debates have been cognisant of the link between jus
sanguinis, statelessness and a deterioration into an ethnonationalist state like
Europen nations post World War II. Most prominently, Ajit Prasad Jain said
before the Constituent Assembly that “citizenship constitutes the rock foundation of our constitution”.
In light of the paramount importance of formal citizenship in ascertaining
belongingness, security and rights, this paper has suggested for a forward-looking and inclusive citizenship law for India that is based on jus soli as opposed
to jus sanguinis. Such an approach stands to benefit the stateless persons that
India is currently housing, including Sri Lankan Tamils.
To extinguish Sri Lankan Tamils’ lack of citizenship, this paper has
put forth interim pathways to Indian citizenship under prevailing law, and
attempted to cast a stronger obligation on courts to make sharper analyses of
the shifts in citizenship law, particularly the requirement of documentation and
the repercussions of the introduction of the category of illegal migrant. In the
long-term, however, this paper strongly believes in the need for a structural
overhaul of citizenship law towards jus soli, a simplified naturalisation process,
and a rejection of the documentation-heavy determination of citizenship and
rights like the NRC process.

